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  Contract	  today	  increasingly	  links	  entrepreneurial	  innovations	  to	  the	  efforts	  and	  finance	  
necessary	  to	  transform	  ideas	  into	  value.	  In	  this	  Chapter,	  we	  describe	  the	  match	  between	  a	  form	  of	  
contract	  that	  	  “braids”	  	  formal	  and	  informal	  contractual	  elements	  in	  novel	  ways	  and	  the	  process	  by	  
which	  innovation	  is	  pursued.	  	  It	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  these	  innovative	  forms	  of	  contract	  have	  
emerged	  first	  in	  markets,	  and	  that	  the	  common	  law,	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  contract,	  then	  play	  catch-­‐up.	  
Between	  the	  time	  contracting	  practice	  adapts	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  innovation	  and	  the	  time	  contract	  
doctrine	  adapts	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  practice,	  law	  acts	  as	  a	  friction	  on	  the	  innovation	  process	  rather	  
than	  a	  lubricant	  to	  it.	  	  Our	  goal	  here	  is	  to	  reduce	  that	  lag	  by	  providing	  a	  theory	  that	  can	  guide	  
courts	  in	  developing	  case	  law	  that	  addresses	  current	  forms	  of	  innovation	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  our	  ongoing	  work.	  	  	  The	  starting	  point	  is	  the	  Knightian	  
distinction	  between	  risk	  and	  uncertainty.	  	  	  In	  our	  view,	  traditional	  contracting	  techniques	  and	  
traditional	  contract	  law	  address	  problems	  of	  risk.	  	  Braiding,	  or	  contracting	  for	  innovation,	  
addresses	  conditions	  of	  uncertainty.	  We	  illustrate	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  distinction	  by	  describing	  
the	  shift	  in	  the	  organizational	  location	  of	  innovation	  —in	  particular	  a	  fundamental	  shift	  from	  
vertical	  integration	  to	  contract	  as	  the	  organizing	  mechanism	  for	  cutting-­‐edge	  innovation.	  	  	  We	  
then	  describe	  the	  braiding	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  contracting	  that	  has	  developed	  to	  organize	  
collaboration	  across	  organizational	  boundaries	  where	  the	  desired	  outcome	  can,	  at	  best,	  be	  
anticipated	  only	  very	  approximately.	  	  Next,	  we	  re-­‐examine	  the	  interaction	  between	  formal	  and	  
informal	  contracting	  to	  understand	  why	  braiding	  was	  not	  envisaged	  as	  a	  theoretical	  possibility	  
before	  it	  became	  a	  salient	  reality,	  and	  to	  make	  theoretical	  sense	  of	  braiding	  now	  that	  it	  has.	  	  
Finally,	  we	  look	  to	  recent	  case	  law,	  especially	  that	  considering	  preliminary	  agreements,	  to	  argue	  
that	  the	  domain	  of	  braiding	  now	  includes	  contexts	  where	  uncertainty	  is	  not	  generated	  by	  
technological	  development,	  and	  we	  examine	  the	  failure	  of	  courts	  to	  recognize	  the	  difference	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contract	  that	  	  “braids”1	  formal	  and	  informal	  contractual	  elements	  in	  novel	  ways	  and	  the	  process	  by	  
which	  innovation	  is	  pursued.	  
It	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  these	  innovative	  forms	  of	  contract	  have	  emerged	  first	  in	  
markets,	  and	  that	  the	  common	  law,	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  contract,	  then	  play	  catch-­‐up.	  Between	  the	  
time	  contracting	  practice	  adapts	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  innovation	  and	  the	  time	  contract	  doctrine	  
adapts	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  practice,	  law	  acts	  as	  a	  friction	  on	  the	  innovation	  process	  rather	  than	  a	  
lubricant	  to	  it.	  	  Our	  goal	  here	  is	  to	  reduce	  that	  lag	  by	  providing	  a	  theory	  that	  can	  guide	  courts	  in	  
developing	  case	  law	  that	  addresses	  current	  forms	  of	  innovation.	  Put	  differently,	  we	  seek	  to	  
provide	  courts	  the	  logic	  necessary	  to	  order	  the	  experience	  that	  Holmes,	  as	  a	  pragmatist,	  thought	  
so	  central	  to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  common	  law.2	  
	  
	   This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  our	  ongoing	  work.	  	  	  The	  starting	  point	  is	  the	  
Knightian	  distinction	  between	  risk	  and	  uncertainty.	  3	  	  In	  our	  view,	  traditional	  contracting	  
techniques	  and	  traditional	  contract	  law	  address	  problems	  of	  risk.	  	  Braiding,	  or	  contracting	  for	  
innovation,	  addresses	  conditions	  of	  uncertainty.	  We	  illustrate	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  distinction	  by	  
describing	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  organizational	  location	  of	  innovation4—in	  particular	  a	  fundamental	  shift	  
from	  vertical	  integration	  to	  contract	  as	  the	  organizing	  mechanism	  for	  cutting-­‐edge	  innovation.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in 
Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1377 (2010)  We draw here on this article, as well as on Ronald J. Gilson, 
Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and 
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 Colum. L.Rev. 431 (2009).   We are grateful to the Kauffman Foundation for research support. 
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, 3 (1881).  When Holmes wrote that “The life of the law has not been logic: it 
has been experience,” he was not referring to passive process.  Rather, the pattern was one in which experience driven 
litigation gave rise to logic – the predicative value of the court’s decision.  This notion that law follows from, rather than 
developing internally independent of, experience reflected Holmes strongly held view, driven by his battlefield experience in 
the Civil War, that logic isolated from experience was ideology, from which came the carnage of the war.  Louis Menand, 
The Metaphysical Club 3-4, 61 (2001). 
3 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 197-232 (1921). 
4 See Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: Technology, Organizational Structure and Financial Contracting, 109 Colum. L. 
Rev. 885 (2009). 
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We	  then	  describe	  the	  braiding	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  contracting	  that	  has	  developed	  to	  organize	  
collaboration	  across	  organizational	  boundaries	  where	  the	  desired	  outcome	  can,	  at	  best,	  be	  
anticipated	  only	  very	  approximately.	  	  Next,	  we	  re-­‐examine	  the	  interaction	  between	  formal	  and	  
informal	  contracting	  to	  understand	  why	  braiding	  was	  not	  envisaged	  as	  a	  theoretical	  possibility	  
before	  it	  became	  a	  salient	  reality,	  and	  to	  make	  theoretical	  sense	  of	  braiding	  now	  that	  it	  has.	  	  
Finally,	  we	  look	  to	  recent	  case	  law,	  especially	  that	  considering	  preliminary	  agreements,	  to	  argue	  
that	  the	  domain	  of	  braiding	  now	  includes	  contexts	  where	  uncertainty	  is	  not	  generated	  by	  
technological	  development,	  and	  we	  examine	  the	  failure	  of	  courts	  to	  recognize	  the	  difference	  
between	  and	  consequences	  of	  low-­‐powered	  and	  high-­‐powered	  enforcement	  in	  addressing	  braided	  
contracts.	  	  
	   In	  particular,	  our	  analysis	  gives	  courts	  concrete	  guidance	  in	  the	  area	  of	  preliminary	  
agreements,	  where	  courts	  for	  the	  first	  time	  are	  undertaking	  to	  enforce	  formal	  agreements—
whether	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  preliminary	  agreement,	  letter	  of	  intent,	  or	  corporate	  acquisition	  
agreement—that	  establish	  a	  process	  by	  which	  the	  parties	  will	  determine	  whether	  an	  innovation	  is	  
possible,	  but	  do	  not	  obligate	  the	  parties	  to	  go	  forward	  with	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  innovation.5	  	  	  In	  
contrast	  to	  the	  unpredictabilitly	  currently	  associated	  with	  judicial	  accounts	  of	  how	  these	  
agreements	  will	  be	  enforced,	  our	  development	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  braided	  contracts	  gives	  the	  court	  
clear	  guidance:	  	  enforce	  the	  process	  established	  by	  the	  formal	  element	  of	  the	  contract	  through	  
low-­‐powered	  reliance	  damages,	  but	  never	  enforce,	  through	  high-­‐powered	  (expectation)	  damages,	  
the	  informal	  substantive	  element	  of	  the	  braid.	  	  This	  rule	  prevents	  the	  formal	  element	  of	  the	  
braided	  contract	  from	  “crowding	  out”	  the	  informal	  element,	  and	  thereby	  preventing	  the	  
innovative	  activity	  from	  going	  forward	  at	  all.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For discussion, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 
Harv. L. Rev. 2007. 
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I.	  	  Innovation,	  Uncertainty	  and	  Industrial	  Organization	  
	   Knight’s	  distinction	  between	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  
contract	  in	  the	  innovative	  process.	  	  Risk	  exists	  when	  future	  states	  of	  the	  world	  can	  be	  estimated	  
probabilistically.	  	  Given	  such	  estimates,	  a	  contract,	  through	  a	  series	  of	  “if	  X,	  then	  Y”	  clauses,	  can	  
more	  or	  less	  specify	  what	  will	  occur	  in	  each	  realized	  state.	  	  Alternatively,	  markets	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
hedge	  against	  particular	  realizations,	  such	  as	  the	  future	  prices	  of	  commodities,	  or	  interest	  or	  
currency	  exchange	  rates.	  
	   Under	  uncertainty,	  in	  contrast,	  future	  states	  of	  the	  world	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  
probabilistically.	  Ex	  ante,	  we	  cannot	  usefully	  specify	  the	  desired	  outcome(s),	  or	  assign	  an	  option	  
providing	  protection	  to	  one	  or	  another	  party	  ex	  post.	  	  In	  our	  analysis,	  innovation	  is	  inherently	  
uncertain:	  an	  innovation	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  same	  process	  that	  ultimately	  leads	  to	  its	  achievement.	  	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  term	  “linear	  innovation,”	  sometimes	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  next	  step	  in	  a	  
predictable	  sequence,6	  is	  an	  oxymoron.	  	  	  
The	  increasing	  importance	  of	  innovation	  in	  this	  sense	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  tendency	  to	  
vertical	  disintegration	  of	  industry.	  Conventional	  industrial	  organization	  theory	  predicts	  that	  when	  
parties	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  must	  make	  transaction-­‐specific	  investments,	  the	  risk	  of	  opportunism	  
will	  drive	  them	  away	  from	  contracts	  and	  toward	  vertical	  integration.7	  This	  pressure	  toward	  sole	  
ownership	  will	  be	  especially	  powerful	  in	  innovative	  industries	  where	  rapid	  technological	  change	  
produces	  high	  levels	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  supply	  relationships.	  Contemporary	  contract	  theory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. Econ. Lit. 1 (1990) and Peter A. Hall & David 
Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in Varieties of Capitalism:  The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage 50--54 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001), distinguish between forms of national capitalism 
that support linear innovation (for example, Germany and Japan) and .those that support non-linear innovation (for example, 
the Untied States). 
7 Much of this transactions cost literature is an extension of the work of Oliver Williamson.  See e.g., OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: 
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).  
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concurs.	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  uncertainty,	  it	  offers	  no	  general	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  assuring	  
both	  efficient	  levels	  of	  transaction-­‐specific	  investment	  ex	  ante	  and	  adjustment	  to	  an	  efficient	  
outcome	  ex	  post	  after	  uncertainty	  is	  resolved.	  	  	  So	  from	  this	  perspective	  too,	  firms	  should	  dominate	  
markets	  as	  a	  means	  to	  organize	  supply	  relationships.	  
For	  much	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  organization	  of	  large	  industry	  tracked	  this	  account.	  
The	  dominant	  firms	  in	  industries	  such	  as	  steel,	  automobiles,	  electric	  machinery,	  and	  food	  
processing—both	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  worldwide—used	  the	  technologies	  of	  the	  second	  
industrial	  revolution8	  to	  achieve	  dramatic	  economies	  of	  scale	  through	  the	  mass	  production	  of	  
standard	  goods	  with	  single-­‐purpose	  or	  dedicated	  machinery.	  	  The	  most	  conspicuous	  
organizational	  feature	  of	  firms	  in	  these	  industries	  was	  vertical	  integration.	  	  
More recently, however, contemporary practice is moving away from this solution.  Companies 
recognize that the escalating rate of change and resulting uncertainty means that they cannot themselves 
maintain cutting-edge technology in every field necessary for an innovative product.  Accordingly, 
companies are increasingly electing to acquire by contract inputs that in the past they had made 
themselves.  Instead of vertical integration, we observe vertical disintegration of firms, the expansion of 
collaborative research and development across firm boundaries, and at the intersection of these, the rise 
of platform production (where the “operating system” and the “applications” it integrates are co-
developed by independent producers). In diverse industries ranging from contract manufacturing to 
pharmaceutical collaborations, these changes are accompanied by an increase in inter-firm relations with 
both parties expecting to innovate jointly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984). 
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In previous work,9 we explored three exemplars of this pattern that ranged from contracts that 
imposed a formal governance structure but no formally enforceable substantive obligations,10 to 
collaborative research agreements that look to the development of a continuing stream of products,11 to 
similar agreements limited to developing a particular product and a consequent end game.12 None	  of	  the	  
familiar	  mechanisms	  for	  coping	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  contractual	  incompleteness	  adequately	  
respond	  to	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  structuring	  transactions	  in	  the	  face	  of	  continuous	  uncertainty.	  	  
But	  these	  exemplars	  demonstrate	  that	  transactional	  lawyers	  in	  a	  number	  of	  industries	  apparently	  
began	  responding	  to	  their	  clients’	  need	  to	  structure	  new	  relationships	  in	  light	  of	  the	  constraints	  
imposed	  by	  uncertainty.	  	  	  
We	  term	  the	  novel	  result	  “contracting for innovation.”  In the next section we describe the 
components of this form of contracting and provide a theoretical account of why the contractual 
innovations that work in practice also work in theory.   
II.	  Contracting	  For	  Innovation	  
Taking	  innovation	  as	  we	  have	  defined	  it,	  the	  contracting	  problem	  is	  to	  craft	  a	  structure	  that	  
a)	  induces	  efficient,	  transaction-­‐specific	  investment	  by	  both	  parties,	  b)	  establishes	  a	  framework	  
for	  iterative	  collaboration	  and	  adjustment	  of	  the	  parties’	  obligations	  under	  conditions	  of	  
continuing	  uncertainty—circumstances	  when	  the	  resolution	  of	  one	  element	  of	  uncertainty	  merely	  
gives	  rise	  to	  another,	  and	  c)	  limits	  the	  risk	  of	  opportunism	  that	  could	  undermine	  the	  incentive	  to	  
make	  relation-­‐specific	  investments	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  
	  	  The	  common	  challenges	  facing	  parties	  contracting	  for	  innovation	  across	  organizational	  
boundaries	  give	  rise	  to	  solutions	  with	  common	  elements.	  	  In	  each	  case,	  a	  process	  of	  collaboration	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 1. 
10 For an example, see the Deere-Standyne agreement in id., 
11 For an example, see the Apple-SCI agreement, id. 
12 For an example, see the Warner-Lambert – Ligand agreement, id. 
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substitutes	  functionally	  for	  ex	  ante	  specification	  of	  the	  desired	  product—the	  process	  defines	  the	  
specification,	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  	  In	  each	  case,	  the	  parties	  make	  relation-­‐specific	  
investments	  in	  learning	  about	  their	  collaborator’s	  capabilities	  that	  raise	  the	  costs	  of	  switching	  to	  
new	  partners,	  and	  so	  restrain	  either	  party	  from	  taking	  advantage	  of	  their	  mutual	  dependency.	  	  	  
Review	  of	  actual	  efforts	  of	  contracting	  for	  innovation	  informs	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  
braiding	  is	  used	  to	  achieve	  these	  outcomes,	  by	  relying	  on	  formal	  contracting	  to	  establish	  processes	  
that	  make	  behavior	  observable	  enough	  to	  support	  informal	  contracting	  over	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  
(uncertain)	  collaboration.13	  	  Braiding	  uses	  formal	  contracts	  to	  create	  governance	  processes	  that	  
support	  iterative	  joint	  effort	  through	  low-­‐powered	  enforcement	  techniques	  that	  specify	  only	  the	  
commitment	  to	  collaborate,	  without	  controlling	  the	  course	  or	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  collaboration.	  	  
This	  formal	  governance	  arrangement	  has	  two	  closely-­‐linked	  components.	  	  	  
The	  first	  is	  a	  commitment	  to	  an	  ongoing	  mutual	  exchange	  of	  information	  designed	  to	  
determine	  if	  a	  project	  is	  feasible,	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  best	  to	  implement	  the	  parties’	  joint	  objectives.	  	  The	  
second	  component	  is	  a	  procedure	  for	  resolving	  disputes	  arising	  from	  the	  first.	  	  Its	  key	  feature—
the	  “contract	  referee	  mechanism”14—is	  a	  requirement	  that	  the	  collaborators	  reach	  unanimous	  (or	  
near	  unanimous)	  agreement	  on	  crucial	  decisions,	  with	  persistent	  disagreement	  resolved	  (or	  not)	  
by	  unanimous	  agreement	  at	  higher	  levels	  of	  management	  from	  each	  firm.	  	  	  Together	  these	  two	  
mechanisms	  render	  observable,	  and	  forestall	  misunderstandings	  about,	  the	  character	  traits	  and	  
substantive	  capabilities	  that	  support	  the	  informal	  contracting	  upon	  which	  the	  parties	  rely	  as,	  
working	  under	  uncertainty,	  they	  encounter	  unanticipated	  problems	  that	  can	  only	  be	  solved	  
jointly.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  parties’	  increasing	  knowledge	  of	  their	  counterparty’s	  capacities	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 1, at 476-89. 
 
14  Id. at 479-81. 
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problem-­‐solving	  type,	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  processes	  specified	  in	  the	  formal	  contract,	  creates	  
switching	  costs—the	  costs	  to	  each	  party	  of	  replacing	  its	  counterparty	  with	  another—that	  
constrain	  subsequent	  opportunistic	  behavior.	  	  
	  	  The	  formal	  element	  of	  a	  braided	  contract	  is	  thus	  sharply	  and	  distinctively	  limited	  in	  what	  
it	  aims	  to	  accomplish.	  	  It	  functions	  to	  allow	  both	  parties	  to	  learn	  about	  each	  other’s	  skills	  and	  
capabilities	  for	  collaborative	  innovation	  and	  to	  develop	  jointly	  the	  routines	  necessary	  to	  working	  
together.	  	  The	  formal	  contract	  does	  not,	  however,	  commit	  either	  party	  to	  develop,	  supply	  or	  
purchase	  any	  product.	  	  That	  commitment	  emerges	  from	  the	  informal	  contract,	  where	  the	  barrier	  
to	  ex	  post	  opportunism	  results	  not	  from	  formal	  enforcement	  of	  obligations	  created	  by	  explicit	  
contract,	  but	  from	  increased	  switching	  costs	  generated	  by	  the	  collaboration	  process	  itself.15	  	  
III.	  	  Braiding	  and	  the	  Threat	  of	  Crowding	  Out	  
The	  conceptual	  difficulty	  at	  this	  point	  in	  the	  analysis	  is	  with	  our	  premise—that	  formal	  and	  
informal	  contracting	  in	  fact	  can	  be	  combined.	  	  The	  academic	  literature	  has	  long	  recognized	  the	  two	  
components	  making	  up	  a	  braided	  contract:	  one	  strand	  that	  is	  formal	  and	  legally	  enforceable	  and	  
one	  strand	  that	  is	  informal	  and	  subject	  only	  to	  self-­‐enforcement.	  	  However,	  the	  literature	  largely	  
has	  either	  ignored	  the	  possibility	  of	  combining	  formal	  and	  informal	  contracting,	  or	  largely	  treated	  
the	  two	  techniques	  as	  mutually	  inconsistent	  substitutes.	  	  Contemporary	  contract	  theory	  typically	  
assumes	  that	  formal	  and	  informal	  methods	  are	  separate	  responses	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  motivating	  
relation-­‐specific	  investments	  in	  a	  collective	  enterprise.	  	  If	  the	  threat	  of	  opportunism	  can	  be	  
addressed	  explicitly	  either	  by	  specifying	  state	  contingent	  outcomes	  or	  by	  assigning	  decision	  rights	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Only where the subject of the braided contract is a discrete project, do we see formal contracting over the output 
of the process.  In the discrete project setting, switching costs discourage opportunism during the collaborative period, but the 
parties have to fear opportunistic renegotiation once the cooperative stage of the project is completed and switching costs no 
longer provide protection. The only issue then remaining is division of the gains from prior cooperation.  As a result, an 
explicit constraint on opportunism must be employed; but at this stage, the uncertainty having been resolved, the contract 
theory solution of allocating rights to decision-making is feasible.	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among	  the	  parties,	  then	  we	  observe	  formal	  contracting;	  if	  not,	  we	  observe	  either	  self-­‐enforcing	  
informal	  contracts	  supported	  relationally	  or,	  when	  these	  cannot	  protect	  specific	  investment,	  
vertical	  integration.16	  	  	  	  Work	  in	  experimental	  economics	  does	  in	  contrast	  address	  the	  possibility	  
of	  formal-­‐informal	  interaction,	  but	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  circumstances	  when	  the	  introduction	  of	  
formal	  contracting	  degrades	  the	  effectiveness	  of,	  or	  “crowds	  out,”	  informal	  contracting.	  	  	  
What	  is	  broadly	  lacking	  in	  both	  literatures	  is	  a	  theory	  of	  when	  and	  why	  the	  parties	  can	  
make	  use	  of	  both	  techniques.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  provide	  a	  first	  step	  toward	  developing	  a	  theory	  of	  
the	  complementary	  interaction	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  contracting	  that	  allows	  braiding.	  	  	  	  
A.	  	  The	  Limits	  of	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  Contracting	  
1.	  	  Formal	  Enforcement:	  The	  Verifiability	  Problem	  
	   The	  capacity	  to	  compel	  disclosure	  of	  private	  information	  is	  the	  defining	  feature	  of	  formal	  
enforcement.	  	  	  	  When	  a	  formal	  contract	  breaks	  down	  due	  to	  the	  opacity	  of	  the	  interactions	  or	  the	  
guile	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  parties,	  courts	  (or	  arbitrators17)	  function	  by	  assessing	  responsibility.	  	  
To	  do	  this,	  courts	  must	  have	  better	  information	  than	  was	  available	  to	  the	  parties.	  	  But	  a	  judge,	  
unlike,	  say,	  a	  basketball	  referee,	  cannot	  directly	  observe	  complex	  interactions	  on	  the	  field	  of	  play	  
and	  then	  declare	  fouls.	  	  	  A	  legal	  referee	  must	  obtain	  information	  indirectly,	  from	  the	  very	  parties	  
who	  dispute	  the	  facts	  of	  their	  “play.”	  	  This	  requires	  that	  the	  court	  have	  the	  power	  to	  impose	  
sanctions	  in	  order	  to	  force	  the	  disputants	  to	  provide	  essential	  information	  known	  only	  to	  them.	  	  
The	  court	  can	  then	  verify	  outcomes	  through	  information	  each	  party	  may	  lack	  individually.	  	  
Without	  a	  judicial	  sanction	  both	  for	  non-­‐production	  and	  for	  misleading	  production	  favorable	  to	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 697–700 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119, 1151 (1990);  Oliver Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 177 (1985); Benjamin 
Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1981); L.G. 
Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980). 
17 Arbitration remains a formal enforcement strategy.  While arbitration displaces some of the legal rules associated with 
litigation, it still requires the intervention of the state to enforce the arbitration award. 
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party’s	  own	  position,	  a	  party	  would	  be	  motivated	  to	  conceal	  evidence	  known	  only	  to	  it:	  the	  court	  
then	  would	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  secure	  information	  even	  as	  good	  as	  the	  parties	  themselves	  possess.	  	  
Breach	  by	  a	  party	  would	  not	  be	  verifiable.	  	  
Verification,	  however,	  is	  costly.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  formal	  enforcement	  can	  break	  down,	  particularly	  
where	  the	  optimal	  actions	  for	  each	  party	  depend	  on	  the	  future	  state	  that	  materializes,	  but	  the	  
future	  is	  uncertain.	  	  In	  that	  circumstance,	  it	  is	  prohibitively	  costly	  or	  impossible	  to	  specify	  most	  
future	  states,	  let	  alone	  the	  appropriate	  action	  that	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  if	  they	  occur.	  	  Under	  these	  
conditions,	  parties	  relying	  on	  formal	  enforcement	  are	  confronted	  with	  two	  choices:	  the	  Scylla	  of	  
“hard”	  terms	  (precise	  rules)	  and	  the	  Charybdis	  of	  “soft”	  terms	  (vague	  standards).	  	  Rule-­‐based	  
contracts	  will	  require	  renegotiation	  after	  the	  uncertainty	  is	  resolved,	  because	  their	  ex	  ante	  
allocation	  of	  rights	  will	  frequently	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  wrong	  ex	  post.	  	  This	  will	  allow	  the	  party	  favored	  
by	  fate	  to	  renegotiate	  from	  strength,	  and	  thus	  undermine	  incentives	  to	  invest.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  costs	  
of	  verifying	  standard-­‐based	  contracts	  and	  the	  corresponding	  risk	  both	  of	  the	  court	  choosing	  the	  
wrong	  proxy—the	  designation	  of	  what	  range	  of	  observable	  outcomes	  should	  dictate	  whether	  
unobservable	  behavior	  would	  be	  “reasonable”—are	  high.	  	  	  [In	  preceding,	  should	  “both”	  be	  
deleted?	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  two	  items	  are	  referenced.	  Also,	  should	  “standard”	  be	  
“standards”?]To	  be	  sure,	  parties	  writing	  more	  complex	  contracts	  can	  ameliorate	  this	  problem	  by	  
using	  combinations	  of	  standards	  and	  rules;	  but	  as	  uncertainty	  increases—precisely	  the	  
circumstances	  of	  innovation—the	  performance	  of	  both	  standards	  and	  rules	  deteriorate.18	  	  
2.	  	  Informal	  Enforcement:	  The	  Observability	  Problem	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Robert	  E.	  Scott	  &	  George	  G.	  Triantis,	  Anticipating	  Litigation	  in	  Contract	  Design,	  115	  Yale	  l.	  J.	  814	  (2006).	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Where	  formal	  enforcement	  depends	  on	  court	  verification,	  informal	  enforcement	  depends	  
entirely	  on	  private	  behavior—one	  party’s	  ability	  to	  observe	  directly	  the	  other’s	  actions,	  and	  the	  
capacity	  to	  sanction	  misbehavior	  when	  observed.	  	  For	  example,	  parties	  to	  an	  agreement	  often	  can	  
observe	  whether	  one	  of	  them	  has	  exercised	  “best	  efforts”	  and	  can	  punish	  a	  slacker,	  even	  though	  it	  
would	  be	  quite	  costly	  to	  convince	  a	  court	  to	  impose	  an	  equivalent	  punishment.	  	  The	  private,	  non-­‐
state	  sanctions	  that	  comprise	  informal	  enforcement	  are	  generally	  thought	  to	  take	  three	  forms,	  
which	  are	  mutually	  supportive	  at	  low-­‐to-­‐intermediate	  levels	  of	  uncertainty,	  increasing	  the	  actors’	  
capacity	  to	  enforce	  contracts	  where	  behavior	  is	  directly	  observable	  to	  them,	  but	  outcomes	  are	  
hard	  to	  verify.	  	  However,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  informal	  enforcement	  also	  breaks	  down	  at	  high	  levels	  of	  
uncertainty,	  making	  it	  no	  substitute	  for	  formal	  enforcement	  when	  the	  actors	  are	  in	  significant	  
ways	  ignorant	  of	  the	  future	  they	  intend	  to	  create.	  	  Put	  differently,	  collaborative	  innovation	  
confronts	  the	  barrier	  that	  both	  familiar	  contracting	  strategies	  break	  down	  in	  just	  the	  circumstance	  
that	  defines	  the	  environment	  of	  innovation.	  	  
A	  first	  type	  of	  informal	  enforcement	  is	  the	  threat	  that	  one	  party	  to	  an	  informal	  contract	  will	  
respond	  to	  its	  counterparty’s	  breach	  by	  reducing	  or	  terminating	  future	  dealings.	  	  This	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  
strategy	  imposes	  losses	  on	  the	  defector	  that,	  in	  prospect,	  create	  disincentives	  to	  breach	  in	  the	  first	  
place.	  19	  	  	  	  
A	  second	  type	  of	  informal	  enforcement	  is	  normative,	  supported	  either	  by	  the	  morality	  or	  tastes	  
of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  rather	  than	  their	  calculations	  of	  individual	  gain.	  	  Much	  experimental	  
evidence	  shows	  that	  approximately	  half	  of	  the	  test	  subjects	  do	  not	  behave	  opportunistically	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Even where the particular parties do not expect to deal with each other in the future, the tit-for-tat enforcement 
structure will still work if one party will trade with others in the future—that is, if trade will be multilateral rather 
than bilateral—so long as the repeat play party’s reputation, the collective experience of parties who have previously 
dealt with a person or firm, becomes known to future counterparties.  The action of future counterparties then serves 
to discipline the misbehaving party. 
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when	  it	  is	  in	  their	  economic	  interest	  to	  do	  so	  and	  they	  are	  not	  under	  threat	  of	  punishment	  or	  
retaliation.20	  	  Similarly,	  experimental	  evidence	  also	  indicates	  a	  widespread,	  but	  not	  universal,	  
taste	  for	  reciprocity—an	  inclination	  to	  reward	  cooperators	  and	  punish	  opportunists	  even	  when	  
the	  subjects	  derive	  no	  direct	  and	  particular	  benefits	  from	  doing	  so.21	  	  Like	  character,	  a	  preference	  
for	  reciprocity	  provides	  one	  explanation	  for	  how	  (and	  why)	  this	  informal	  sanctioning	  works.	  	  
Absent	  a	  taste	  for	  reciprocity,	  it	  may	  be	  irrational	  for	  individuals	  to	  absorb	  the	  costs	  of	  shaming,	  
boycotting,	  and	  ostracizing.	  	  	  	  
A	  third	  type	  of	  informal	  enforcement	  is	  normative	  or	  dispositional	  informal	  sanctions,	  which	  
can	  operate	  at	  the	  level	  of	  social	  groups	  rather	  than	  among	  individuals.	  	  In	  compact	  and	  
homogenous	  communities,	  for	  instance,	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  can	  sanction	  the	  breach	  of	  one	  
member’s	  obligation	  to	  another	  by	  ostracizing	  the	  malefactor,	  cutting	  off	  not	  just	  business	  ties	  but	  
all	  the	  benefits	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  group.	  	  
The	  different	  supports	  for	  informal	  contracting	  generally	  complement	  each	  other,	  at	  least	  as	  
the	  uncertainty—and	  with	  it	  the	  complexity—of	  transactions	  remains	  at	   low-­‐to-­‐moderate	  levels.	  	  
But	   informal	  enforcement	  depends	  on	  clear	  observation	  of	  counterparty’s	  actions:	   the	  simpler	  a	  
party’s	  action,	   the	  easier	   it	   is	   for	  the	  counterparty	  to	  observe	  and	  characterize.	   	  Thus	   increasing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature,	  see	  Ernst	  Fehr	  &	  Klaus	  Schmidt,	  Theories	  of	  Fairness	  and	  Reciprocity:	  Evidence	  and	  
Economic	  Applications,	  University	  of	  Zurich,	  Institute	  for	  Empirical	  Research	  in	  Economics,	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  75,	  at	  
2-­‐3	  (2001).	  
21 The experimental evidence on individuals’ propensity to reciprocate yields two key findings.  First, many people respond 
cooperatively to generous acts and, conversely, punish non-cooperative behavior.  Second, the observed preference for 
reciprocity is heterogeneous.  Some people exhibit reciprocal behavior and others are selfish.  Taking all the experiments 
together, the fraction of reciprocally fair subjects ranges from 40 to 60% as does the fraction of subjects who are selfish.  For 
discussion, see e.g., Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device:  Experimental Evidence, 65 
Econometrica 833, 850 (1997) (finding roughly half of subjects punishing shirkers, and roughly half rewarding non-
shirkers).; Ernst Fehr & Simon Gatcher, Fairness and Retaliation:  The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. Econ. Persp. at 159, 
162 (2000) (“Many studies have carried out detailed analyses of individual decisions and found that the fraction of subjects 
exhibiting reciprocal choices is between forty and sixty-six percent.”).   For applications of this experimental evidence to 
contract theory, see Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 1661-75, 
(2003). 
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complexity	  interferes	  with	  all	  three	  types	  of	  informal	  enforcement.	  	  The	  probability	  of	  a	  mistake	  in	  
playing	   tit-­‐for-­‐tat	   increases	  with	   the	  difficulty	   of	   assessing	   a	   counterparty’s	   actions.	  And	  by	   the	  
same	  token,	  the	  capacity	  to	  assess	  whether	  one’s	  counterparty	  has	  a	  taste	  for	  reciprocity,	  or	  is	  of	  a	  
character	   to	   forgo	   opportunism,	   or	   is	   observing	   community	   norms,	   also	   degrades	   in	   a	   complex	  
environment:	   the	   match	   between	   a	   party’s	   actual	   behavior	   and	   the	   character	   of	   that	   party	  
becomes	  more	  difficult	  to	  assess.	  
	   In	  a	  mistake-­‐prone,	  or	  “noisy”	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat,	  environment,	  	  misreading	  a	  counterparty’s	  actions	  
as	  opportunistic	  first	  leads	  to	  retaliation,	  which	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  responsive	  retaliation	  and	  a	  cycle	  
of	  opportunistic	  behavior	  that	  continues	  until	  another	  mistake	  resets	  the	  cooperative	  equilibrium.	  	  	  
In	  such	  a	  setting,	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  most	  effective	  strategy	  because	  it	  risks	  triggering	  a	  
retaliatory	  cycle.	  	  	  The	  dominant	  strategy	  is	  more	  forgiving:	  it	  allows	  some	  percentage	  of	  the	  other	  
party’s	  defections	  to	  go	  unpunished.22	  	  	  This	  is	  where	  the	  complementarity	  of	  the	  supports	  for	  
informal	  contracting	  becomes	  relevant.	  	  A	  significant	  probability	  that	  a	  counterparty	  has	  a	  taste	  
for	  reciprocity,	  or	  is	  of	  a	  character	  that	  dictates	  forgoing	  opportunism,	  makes	  it	  less	  threatening	  to	  
be	  more	  forgiving	  of	  an	  apparent	  defection.	  	  An	  independent	  reason	  to	  trust	  the	  counterparty	  
results	  in	  a	  corresponding	  higher	  probability	  that	  the	  apparent	  defection	  was	  really	  a	  
misunderstanding.	  	  
Moreover,	  just	  as	  the	  normative	  modes	  of	  informal	  enforcement	  can	  support	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  
calculations	  of	  the	  value	  of	  ongoing	  relations	  when	  counterparty’s	  actual	  behavior	  becomes	  less	  
observable,	  so	  too	  can	  the	  existence	  of	  ongoing	  relations	  increase	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  normative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The literature is well developed and uncontroversial: generous tit-for-tat strategies outperform simple tit-for-tat strategies 
in noisy environments.  See e.g., M. Nowack & K. Sigmund, Tit for Tat in Heterogeneous Populations, 364 Nature 56-58 
(1992); H.C.J. Godfray, The Evolution of Forgiveness, 255 Nature 206 (1992); J. Bendor, R.M. Kramer, & S. Stout, When in 
Doubt …: Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma, 35 J. Conflict Res. 691 (1991); Robert Axelrod & D. Dion, The 
Further Evolution of Cooperation, 242 Science 1385 (1988). 
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enforcement.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  an	  ongoing	  relationship	  that	  allows	  for	  retaliation	  in	  the	  event	  of	  
counterparty	  opportunism	  makes	  it	  less	  risky	  for	  a	  party	  to	  act	  on	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  
counterparty	  values	  reciprocity	  or	  forgoes	  opportunism.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  
continuing	  relationship	  allows	  the	  parties	  to	  learn	  about	  each	  other’s	  tastes	  and	  character.	  	  	  Thus	  
we	  see	  a	  virtuous	  cycle,	  in	  which	  each	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  support	  informal	  contracting	  
reinforces	  the	  others	  by	  making	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  counterparties	  more	  observable—less	  subject	  
to	  mistaken	  assessment—to	  each	  other.	  	  	  Indeed,	  given	  the	  mutually	  supportive	  relation	  among	  
the	  types	  of	  informal	  enforcement,	  we	  can	  think	  of	  them	  (at	  least	  at	  low-­‐to-­‐moderate	  levels	  of	  
uncertainty)	  as	  aspects	  of	  a	  single	  informal	  enforcement	  mechanism,	  one	  rooted	  in	  ongoing	  
relations	  among	  parties	  supported	  by	  a	  (normative)	  disposition	  to	  reciprocity.	  
The	  experimental	  evidence	  suggests,	  moreover,	  that	  informal	  enforcement,	  when	  it	  is	  effective,	  
is	  both	  cheaper	  and	  better	  than	  formal	  enforcement.	  	  Informal	  enforcement	  is	  cheaper	  because	  a	  
party	  only	  incurs	  the	  costs	  of	  observing	  the	  other’s	  behavior,	  while	  formal	  enforcement	  requires	  
the	  parties	  to	  expend	  additional	  resources	  (attorneys	  fees,	  court	  costs,	  etc.)	  in	  verifying	  that	  
behavior	  to	  a	  court.	  	  Moreover,	  when	  informal	  enforcement	  works,	  it	  is	  also	  better.	  	  It	  permits	  
parties	  to	  make	  credible	  promises	  regarding	  observable	  (and	  perhaps	  only	  observable	  with	  
repetition)	  but	  non-­‐verifiable	  measures	  of	  performance,	  thus	  allowing	  parties	  to	  avoid	  the	  risk	  of	  
opportunism	  arising	  from	  formal	  enforcement	  of	  a	  precise	  rule	  or	  the	  moral	  hazard	  associated	  
with	  the	  ex	  post	  application	  of	  a	  broad	  standard.	  	  	  These	  advantages	  explain	  why,	  in	  commercial	  
contracting,	  parties	  often	  rely	  on	  informal	  enforcement	  even	  when	  formal	  sanctions	  are	  
available.23	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 This insight was first explored in Stewart Macaulay’s classic account of how commercial contractual relationships rely on 
informal enforcement even when the parties previously have entered into to a formal, legally enforceable contract.  Stewart 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:  A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963). .   
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These	  mechanisms	  of	  informal	  enforcement,	  however,	  are	  subject	  to	  inherent	  limitations.	  	  
Informal	  contracting,	  even	  that	  supported	  by	  taste	  and	  character,	  works	  best	  with	  repeat	  play	  in	  
the	  narrowest	  sense:	  the	  same	  actors	  doing	  the	  same	  things	  with	  each	  other	  again	  and	  again,	  
makes	  conduct	  more	  observable,	  an	  indispensable	  element	  of	  informal	  contracting.	  	  The	  more	  
actors	  undertake	  novel	  things	  with	  strangers—precisely	  the	  conditions	  of	  collaborative	  
innovation	  in	  the	  faceoff	  uncertainty	  —the	  greater	  their	  chances	  either	  of	  mischaracterizing	  each	  
other’s	  acts	  and	  intentions,	  or	  lacking	  the	  ability	  to	  characterize	  what	  the	  others	  are	  doing	  at	  all.	  	  	  
When	  changing	  sequences	  of	  novel	  performances	  among	  unfamiliar	  actors	  dissipate	  the	  
transparency	  necessary	  for	  informal	  contracting,	  a	  switch	  to	  forgiving	  strategies	  no	  longer	  
interrupts	  the	  vicious	  cycles	  of	  mistake,	  retaliation	  and	  counter-­‐response,	  as	  can	  occur	  at	  lower	  
levels	  of	  uncertainty.	  	  	  Instead,	  retaliations	  escalate	  and	  destroy	  the	  relation.	  	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
In sum, formal contracting has an advantage where performance is verifiable ex post but not 
necessarily observable ex ante.  Informal contracting has an advantage where performance is observable 
but costly to verify.  But both can break down in the highly uncertain environments that are the domain 
of innovation.  Can contract planners address such circumstances by combining the two strategies in a 
fashion that is more effective than either standing alone?    
B.	  	  Complements	  or	  Substitutes?	  Explaining	  the	  Rivalry	  between	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  
Enforcement.	  
	  
The	  preceding	  discussion	  suggests	  that	  contracting	  parties	  should	  be	  motivated	  to	  capture	  the	  
benefits	  of	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	  enforcement,	  by	  relying	  on	  formal	  enforcement	  to	  solve	  
complex	  problems	  with	  noisy	  interactions	  and	  on	  informal	  mechanisms	  to	  enforce	  contingencies	  
that	  are	  difficult	  to	  verify	  but	  clear	  enough	  to	  be	  observable.	  	  A	  mixed	  strategy	  is	  feasible	  if	  formal	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and	  informal	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  complements,	  but	  not	  if	  they	  are	  substitutes	  in	  that	  
recourse	  to	  formal	  contracting	  “crowds	  out”	  the	  operation	  of	  informal	  contracting.	  	  Here	  the	  
existing	  theory	  and	  evidence	  offer	  limited	  guidance.	  	  Predicting	  when	  the	  crowding	  out	  effect	  
dominates	  requires	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  mechanism	  through	  which	  formal	  enforcement	  
degrades	  the	  operation	  of	  informal	  contracting.	  	  
	   Consistent	  with	  our	  analysis	  that	  informal	  contracting	  depends	  on	  the	  observability	  of	  a	  
counterparty’s	  actions,	  we	  argue	  that	  crowding	  out	  occurs	  when	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  formal	  contract	  
and	  the	  potential	  for	  high-­‐powered	  legal	  sanctions	  degrade	  the	  information	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  counterparties	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  interactions.24	  	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  see	  crowding	  out	  
when	  formal	  contracting	  makes	  the	  parties’	  actions	  and	  performance	  less	  observable.	  	  This	  occurs	  
because	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  two	  interrelated	  factors:	  	  a)	  formal	  enforcement	  changes	  the	  way	  a	  party	  
perceives	  the	  observed	  behavior	  of	  the	  counterparty	  and	  b)	  formal	  enforcement	  reduces	  the	  
number	  of	  observations	  of	  the	  very	  behavior	  that	  signals	  an	  intention	  to	  cooperate.	  
First,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  parties’	  behavior	  will	  change	  depending	  on	  whether	  they	  
believe	  they	  are	  engaged	  in	  norm-­‐based	  or	  arm’s-­‐length	  arrangements.25	  	  The	  most	  familiar	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The distinction between high-powered legal sanctions that drive out informal enforcement and low-powered sanctions that, 
we argue below, do not result in crowding out is critical to our theory of how braiding works. High-powered enforcement 
consists of the imposition of standard breach of contract remedies for a failure to perform specified contractual obligations. 
High-powered enforcement, then, is tied to outcome variables and provides incentives that induce parties to take specified 
substantive actions designed to maximize expected surplus..   
25 We acknowledge that our argument could be cast entirely in terms of the conditions under which a more forgiving 
form of the self-interested strategy of tit-for-tat displaces a less forgiving one, without reference to the conditions 
under which intrinsic or moral motives are  crowded out by extrinsic, gain-oriented ones.  For two reasons, we 
choose instead to combine the two forms of argument, and, as in the preceding discussion, even to underscore their 
complementarity.  First, we are convinced by the experimental evidence that intrinsic motivation—particularly a 
propensity to reciprocity—is a fact of (some) human behavior.  To be sure, we are a long way from understanding 
the operation and implications of such intrinsic motivation; but it seems odd to transcribe what we do know of it into 
a rational-choice vocabulary that denies, or least questions its existence.  Second, to acknowledge the existence of 
intrinsic motivation, is hardly to abandon the postulate of rational action in economic exchanges of the kind under 
consideration here.  Rational actors are perfectly capable of making rational—calculating decisions—about when, 
and in relation to whom, to rely on intrinsic motivation.  Indeed, a central claim in our braiding argument is that 
under uncertainty it is rational for actors to design institutions that allow them to develop a counterparty’s propensity 
to reciprocity, along with her capacities.  For an earlier effort to reconcile rational-choice and intrinsic approaches to 
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example	  is	  the	  experiment	  of	  using	  formal	  sanctions	  to	  cause	  parents	  to	  be	  timely	  in	  picking	  up	  
their	  children	  from	  nursery	  school.	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  improve	  punctuality,	  a	  fine	  was	  imposed	  to	  
encourage	  compliance.	  	  But	  rather	  than	  increasing	  compliance,	  imposing	  a	  fine	  caused	  late	  
pickups	  to	  increase.	  	  The	  formal	  fine	  “crowded	  out”	  the	  reputation-­‐based	  norm	  by	  changing	  the	  
parents’	  perception	  of	  each	  others’	  obligation	  from	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  community	  to	  a	  price	  for	  
additional	  day	  care.26	  	  	  
Similar	  results	  are	  reported	  in	  more	  commercial	  settings.27	  	  Studies	  indicate	  that	  when	  offered	  
a	  contract	  whose	  performance	  is	  based	  only	  on	  trust,	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  individuals	  will	  both	  
pay	  higher	  prices	  and	  extend	  higher	  levels	  of	  effort	  than	  narrow	  self-­‐interest	  would	  dictate.	  	  But	  
when	  offered	  the	  same	  choices	  plus	  the	  possibility	  of	  having	  a	  third	  party	  impose	  a	  monetary	  
sanction	  if	  the	  promisor	  fails	  to	  perform,	  the	  average	  price	  offered	  and	  the	  average	  effort	  given	  
declines	  significantly.	  	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  formal	  enforcement	  option	  causes	  shirking	  to	  
increase	  and	  trust	  vanishes	  almost	  completely.28	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  formal	  sanction	  
that	  governs	  all	  of	  the	  parties’	  actions	  under	  the	  contract	  results	  in	  a	  “cognitive	  shift	  that	  crowds	  
out	  norm-­‐based	  social	  behavior	  and	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  income	  maximizing	  behavior.”29	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
trust, see See Charles Sabel, “Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy,” in 
Explorations in Economic Sociology, ed. Richard Swedberg 104-44 (1993).  For a review of the persistent tension 
between rational choice and intrinsic perspectives, see Christos J. Paraskevopoulos, Social Capital,” Comparative 
Politics, July 2010 at 475-494.  We are grateful to Yochai Benckler for reminding us of just how far we are from a 
full understanding of intrinsic motivation and its relation to institutional rather than individual behavior.. 
 
26 Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini,  A Fine is a Price, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2000).  An extensive literature in social psychology 
also considers the crowding out of intrinsic motivations.  See Edward L. Deci, R. Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta-
Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivations, 125 Psych. Bull. 627  
(1999). 
27 See e.g., Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law:  On Contract Enforcement, Trust and 
Crowding, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 131 (2001). 
28	  Ernst	  Fehr	  &	  Simon	  Gachter,	  Do	  Incentive	  Contracts	  Crowd	  Out	  Voluntary	  Cooperation?	  University	  of	  Zurich,	  Institute	  
for	  Empirical	  Research	  in	  Economics,	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  34,	  Apr.	  2002)	  available	  at	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=313028.	  	  
A	  similar	  result	  is	  reported	  by	  Daniel	  Houser,	  Erte	  Xiao,	  Kevin	  McCabe,	  &	  Vernon	  Smith,	  When	  Punishment	  Fails:	  
Research	  on	  Sanctions,	  Intentions	  and	  Non-­Cooperation,	  62	  Games	  &	  Econ.	  Behav.	  509	  (2008).	  
29 Houser et al, supra note 28. 
	   18	  
	   Moreover,	  when	  the	  introduction	  of	  formal	  penalties	  changes	  the	  parties’	  perception	  of	  
their	  interaction,	  that	  change	  also	  may	  change	  the	  signal	  indicating	  the	  taste	  or	  character	  of	  the	  
party	  who	  proposed	  the	  formal	  penalty.	  	  	  A	  party’s	  willingness	  to	  expend	  resources	  to	  create	  a	  
threat	  of	  significant	  damages	  for	  failure	  to	  perform	  the	  formal	  contract	  may	  indicate	  that	  the	  party	  
is	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  reciprocator.	  	  	  Once	  a	  counterparty’s	  character	  becomes	  less	  observable	  and	  
(correctly	  or	  not)	  the	  party	  is	  identified	  as	  potentially	  opportunistic,	  only	  fully	  formal	  contacts	  will	  
be	  chosen	  
	  	  	  	  	  Second,	  “high-­‐powered”	  formal	  enforcement	  contributes	  to	  crowding	  out	  by	  suppressing	  
information	  that	  supports	  reciprocity.	  	  	  	  For	  example,	  one	  party’s	  request	  for	  an	  adjustment	  of	  
contractual	  duties	  subsequently	  may	  be	  found	  to	  justify	  the	  other	  party’s	  declaring	  an	  anticipatory	  
repudiation	  of	  the	  contract,	  thereby	  exposing	  the	  requesting	  party	  to	  substantial	  damages.	  	  	  A	  
single	  misstep	  can	  transform	  a	  surplus-­‐generating	  cooperative	  enterprise	  into	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game.30	  	  
This	  threat,	  in	  turn,	  deters	  actions—such	  as	  requests	  for	  mid	  course	  adjustment	  of	  the	  contract—
that	  invite	  a	  counterparty	  to	  reciprocate	  proportionally	  and	  informally	  and	  that	  can	  confirm	  a	  
party’s	  tastes	  or	  character.	  	  In	  short,	  high-­‐powered	  penalties	  dramatically	  raise	  the	  stakes	  
associated	  with	  observability-­‐based	  informal	  contracting,	  leaving	  the	  parties	  to	  rely	  on	  verifiable	  
formal	  rules.	  	  
IV.	  Braiding	  in	  the	  Courts:	  Preliminary	  Agreements	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
30 In addition to the notion that only one party can breach and that material breach results in compensatory damages as well 
as loss of accrued contract rights, rules governing insecurity and anticipatory breach permit one party to threaten these 
consequences whenever the other discloses anticipated difficulties in performance.  In addition, the mitigation doctrine only 
operates once a party forfeits all rights by breaching.  Until there is a breach, the counterparty can ignore requests for 
adjustments that might reduce the consequences of non-performance.  The threat of the ultimate sanction thus deters parties 
from voluntarily revealing the information needed for the counterparty to adjust informally. Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation 
Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va. L.Rev. 967, 1011 – 1018 (1983).  
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Ideally,	  courts	  would	  respond	  to	  the	  need	  for	  the	  parties	  to	  initially	  address	  a	  project’s	  
feasibility	  by	  enforcing	  the	  chosen	  methods	  of	  mutual	  cooperation	  on	  terms	  consistent	  with	  the	  
arrangements	  themselves.	  	  Low-­‐powered	  sanctions	  designed	  to	  encourage	  compliance	  with	  the	  
information	  exchange	  regime	  (and	  the	  informal	  relations	  it	  supports)	  would	  be	  imposed	  while	  
avoiding	  high-­‐powered	  sanctions	  that	  crowd	  out	  informality,	  and	  destroy	  the	  braid,	  would	  be	  
avoided.	  	  And	  indeed,	  this	  is	  what	  we	  are	  beginning	  to	  see:	  courts	  in	  leading	  cases	  are	  sanctioning	  
overtly	  selfish	  abuse	  of	  information-­‐exchange	  regimes.	  	  But	  because	  the	  sanction	  relates	  only	  to	  
the	  commitment	  to	  collaborate,	  damages	  are	  limited	  in	  principle	  to	  the	  reliance	  costs	  incurred	  in	  
the	  collaboration	  rather	  than	  lost	  profits	  from	  not	  going	  forward	  with	  the	  project.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  
collaboration	  commitment	  can	  achieve	  its	  intended	  purpose	  of	  generating	  information	  and	  trust	  
precisely;	  low-­‐powered	  formal	  enforcement	  does	  not	  drive	  out	  informal	  enforcement.31	  
As	  might	  be	  anticipated	  in	  an	  emergent	  area	  of	  law,	  the	  decisions	  of	  courts	  called	  on	  to	  
enforce	  braided	  contracts	  are	  not	  uniformly	  consistent	  with	  the	  enforcement	  theory	  we	  have	  
developed	  here.	  	  Some	  decisions	  invite	  the	  award	  of	  damages	  for	  parties	  who	  participate	  faithfully	  
in	  the	  information	  exchange	  regime	  but	  then	  decide	  that	  it	  is	  not	  profitable	  for	  them	  to	  pursue	  the	  
joint	  project	  	  	  Other	  decisions	  contemplate	  (or	  at	  least	  invite	  the	  possibility	  of)	  the	  award	  of	  full	  
expectation	  damages—that	  is,	  high-­‐powered	  enforcement—for	  breach	  of	  the	  information-­‐
exchange	  obligation.	  	  	  In	  both	  instances,	  courts	  fail	  to	  appreciate	  the	  importance	  of	  limiting	  formal	  
enforcement	  to	  low-­‐powered	  sanctions	  focused	  on	  willful	  violations	  of	  the	  collaboration	  
agreement	  itself	  and	  thereby	  create	  the	  kind	  of	  incentives	  that	  undo	  braiding	  by	  inducing	  strategic	  
crowding	  out	  of	  informal	  enforcement.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 1. 
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In	  this	  Part,	  we	  review	  judicial	  decisions	  that	  address	  the	  contract	  doctrine	  applicable	  to	  
contracting	  for	  innovation.	  	  Although	  pertinent	  cases	  have	  arisen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  contractual	  and	  
anti-­‐trust	  disputes	  over	  joint	  development	  of	  technology,32	  we	  extend	  the	  reach	  of	  our	  analysis	  by	  
focusing	  on	  the	  area	  of	  preliminary	  agreements	  or	  letters	  of	  intent,	  as	  they	  are	  termed	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  corporate	  acquisitions.	  	  In	  these	  settings	  as	  well,	  parties	  realize	  that	  the	  feasibility	  of	  
many	  projects	  can	  only	  be	  established	  by	  joint	  investment	  in	  the	  production	  of	  information	  
necessary	  to	  make	  that	  very	  determination,	  and	  consequently	  distinguish	  agreement	  on	  the	  
process	  of	  disciplined	  co-­‐evaluation	  from	  final	  agreement	  on	  the	  actual	  project.	  	  	  
We	  see	  cases	  in	  these	  domains	  in	  which	  courts	  get	  it	  right	  by	  applying	  low-­‐powered	  
enforcement	  to	  commitments	  to	  collaboratively	  determine	  the	  feasibility	  of	  a	  potential	  project,	  
and	  declining	  to	  enforce	  at	  all	  claims	  that	  a	  party	  wrongfully	  refused	  to	  actually	  pursue	  the	  project.	  	  
But	  we	  also	  see	  cases	  where	  the	  court	  gets	  it	  wrong	  by	  holding	  out	  the	  possibility	  either	  of	  
imposing	  damages	  on	  parties	  who	  participate	  faithfully	  in	  the	  information	  exchange	  regime	  but	  
then	  decide	  not	  to	  pursue	  the	  joint	  project,	  or	  the	  award	  of	  full	  expectation	  damages	  for	  breach	  of	  
the	  information	  exchange	  obligation.	  	  The	  divergent	  approaches	  to	  formal	  enforcement	  reveal	  that	  
the	  courts	  lack	  a	  sound	  theoretical	  construct	  that	  informs	  their	  treatment	  of	  braided	  contracts.	  	  
We	  show	  here	  that	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  theory	  can	  help	  courts	  to	  frame	  the	  proper	  contract	  
doctrine,	  and	  thereby	  facilitate	  innovation.	  
A.	  	  	  Braiding	  in	  Preliminary	  Agreements.	  
	   Assume	  two	  commercial	  parties	  agree	  to	  collaborate	  in	  investigating	  the	  prospects	  for	  
what	  they	  hope	  to	  be	  a	  profitable	  commercial	  project.33	  	  The	  parties	  agree	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 1.  
33 The discussion in this section draws on Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 661 (2007).   
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initial	  investment	  that	  each	  is	  to	  make	  to	  evaluate	  the	  project,	  but	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  ultimate	  project	  
cannot	  be	  determined	  without	  that	  initial	  investment.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  parties	  agree	  to	  proceed	  
with	  their	  initial	  investments	  and	  also	  agree	  to	  negotiate	  the	  remaining	  terms	  of	  the	  contract	  once	  
they	  can	  observe	  the	  fruits	  of	  their	  efforts.	  	  These	  two	  parties	  have	  reached	  what	  the	  law	  now	  
recognizes	  as	  a	  “preliminary	  agreement.”	  	  Only	  by	  each	  party	  investing	  and	  sharing	  the	  
information	  that	  their	  investment	  reveals	  can	  they	  determine	  collaboratively	  whether	  their	  
project	  can	  succeed.	  	  The	  increased	  knowledge	  about	  the	  project	  revealed	  by	  the	  initial	  
investments	  will	  then	  permit	  the	  parties	  to	  determine	  whether	  to	  finalize	  the	  deal	  with	  a	  fully	  
enforceable	  contract	  and	  on	  what	  terms.	  
	   The	  legal	  question	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  a	  preliminary	  agreement	  that	  looks	  to	  the	  future	  
exchange	  of	  private	  information	  is	  formally	  enforceable?	  	  	  The	  question	  is	  important	  because	  the	  
parties	  meet	  as	  strangers	  with	  no	  necessary	  prospect	  of	  an	  ongoing	  relationship	  (and	  so	  with	  no	  
basis	  for	  trust).	  	  Thus	  the	  risk	  of	  opportunism	  is	  significant.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  where	  the	  
parties	  undertake	  to	  make	  preliminary	  investments	  concurrently	  and	  then	  to	  share	  the	  
information	  that	  the	  investments	  yield.	  	  Suppose	  one	  party	  then	  elects	  instead	  to	  wait	  and	  see	  
what	  comes	  of	  her	  counterparty’s	  investment—in	  effect	  reneging	  on	  the	  mutual	  commitment	  to	  
collaborate.	  	  Delaying	  a	  promised	  investment	  under	  these	  conditions	  offers	  several	  strategic	  
advantages.	  	  First,	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  and	  her	  partner’s	  investment	  is	  likely	  to	  reveal	  whether	  the	  
project	  will	  be	  profitable.	  	  If	  so,	  the	  opportunistic	  party—having	  yet	  to	  make	  any	  investment	  in	  the	  
project—can	  exploit	  the	  counterparty	  in	  a	  negotiation	  over	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  ultimate	  contract.	  	  
Second,	  if	  the	  project	  proves	  unsuccessful,	  delay	  permits	  the	  opportunistic	  party	  to	  avoid	  what	  
otherwise	  would	  have	  been	  sunk	  costs.	  	  Those	  savings	  will	  likely	  be	  larger	  than	  any	  offsetting	  
losses	  from	  delay	  if	  the	  project	  instead	  proves	  profitable.	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Historically,	  such	  preliminary	  agreements	  were	  unenforceable	  under	  the	  indefiniteness	  
doctrine	  of	  the	  common	  law	  of	  contracts.	  	  Recently,	  however,	  courts	  have	  affected	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  
doctrine	  by	  relaxing	  the	  common	  law	  rule	  under	  which	  parties	  are	  either	  fully	  bound	  or	  not	  bound	  
at	  all.	  	  Instead,	  a	  new	  enforcement	  rule	  is	  emerging	  to	  govern	  cases	  where	  the	  parties	  contemplate	  
further	  negotiations.34	  	  This	  new	  rule	  responds	  to	  the	  increasing	  importance	  to	  successful	  
collaborations	  of	  the	  search	  for	  new	  partners	  in	  an	  uncertain	  environment.	  	  The	  new	  rule	  starts	  
with	  the	  presumption	  that	  preliminary	  agreements	  typically	  do	  not	  create	  fully	  binding	  
contracts.35	  	  This	  presumption	  rests	  on	  the	  traditional	  common	  law	  view	  that	  courts	  should	  not	  
hold	  parties	  to	  contracts	  unless	  the	  parties	  intended	  to	  make	  them.	  	  The	  shift	  comes	  from	  courts	  
now	  recognizing	  that	  welfare	  gains	  can	  result	  from	  attaching	  some	  level	  of	  formal	  enforcement	  to	  
agreements	  to	  collaborate	  that	  were	  intended	  to	  bind	  despite	  the	  need	  for	  further	  negotiation.	  	  
The	  new	  default	  rule	  thus	  enforces	  “a	  mutual	  commitment	  to	  negotiate	  together	  in	  good	  faith	  in	  an	  
effort	  to	  reach	  final	  agreement.”36	  	  Neither	  party,	  however,	  has	  a	  right	  to	  demand	  performance	  of	  
the	  contemplated	  transaction.	  	  If	  the	  parties	  cannot	  ultimately	  agree	  on	  a	  final	  contract,	  they	  may	  
abandon	  the	  deal.	  	  Both	  parties	  thus	  enter	  into	  an	  option	  on	  the	  ultimate	  deal,	  which	  is	  exercisable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  The	  rule	  originated	  with	  the	  opinion	  of	  Judge	  Pierre	  Leval	  in	  Teachers	  Insurance	  and	  Annuity	  Association	  
of	  America	  v.	  Tribune	  Co.,	  670	  F.	  Supp.	  481,	  488	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1987).	  	  Judge	  Leval	  identified	  two	  separate	  types	  of	  
“preliminary	  agreements.”	  	  He	  labeled	  as	  “Type	  I”	  those	  cases	  where	  the	  parties	  have	  agreed	  on	  all	  material	  terms	  
but	  have	  also	  agreed	  to	  memorialize	  their	  agreement	  in	  a	  more	  formal	  document.	  	  Disputes	  arise	  primarily	  because	  
parties	  have	  failed	  to	  express	  clearly	  their	  intention	  as	  to	  when	  their	  arrangement	  would	  be	  legally	  enforceable.	  	  Here	  
the	  question	  is	  solely	  one	  of	  timing—when	  have	  the	  parties	  manifested	  an	  intention	  to	  be	  legally	  bound?	  	  In	  contrast,	  
“Type	  II”	  agreements	  concern	  binding	  preliminary	  commitments,	  the	  preliminary	  agreements	  we	  analyze	  here.	  	  In	  
this	  latter	  case,	  the	  parties	  agree	  on	  certain	  terms	  but	  leave	  possibly	  important	  terms	  open	  to	  further	  negotiation.	  	  
This	  requires	  courts	  to	  determine	  whether	  such	  an	  agreement	  had	  been	  made,	  what	  the	  duty	  to	  bargain	  in	  good	  faith	  
entails,	  and	  which	  remedy	  should	  be	  awarded	  for	  breach	  of	  that	  duty.	  	  This	  framework	  has	  been	  followed	  in	  at	  least	  
thirteen	  states,	  sixteen	  federal	  district	  courts	  and	  seven	  federal	  circuits.	  See	  Schwarz	  &	  Scott,	  supra	  note	  –	  at	  76-­‐80.	  
35 See R.G. Group Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1984). 
36 TIAA v. Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 498. 
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after	  the	  parties	  learn	  the	  information	  produced	  through	  the	  preliminary	  investments	  and	  whose	  
price	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  preliminary	  investment.	  	  
This	  new	  rule	  governing	  preliminary	  agreements	  to	  collaborate—creating	  a	  legal	  duty	  to	  
bargain	  in	  good	  faith	  but	  not	  requiring	  the	  parties	  to	  agree—is	  an	  appropriate	  first	  step	  in	  solving	  
the	  parties’	  contracting	  problem.	  	  As	  we	  argued	  above,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  attach	  some	  formal	  support	  
to	  agreements	  that	  depend	  on	  initial	  learning	  to	  achieve	  innovation,	  particularly	  when	  the	  
imposition	  of	  low-­‐powered	  enforcement	  stimulates	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  build	  trust.	  	  The	  
contemporary	  judicial	  approach	  to	  preliminary	  agreements	  of	  this	  sort	  appropriately	  opens	  the	  
door	  to	  judicial	  support	  of	  mutual	  learning	  in	  contracts	  for	  innovation.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  courts’	  
experience	  so	  far	  provides	  little	  normative	  guidance	  concerning	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  enforceable	  
obligation,	  or	  the	  consequences	  of	  its	  breach.	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  shortcoming	  when,	  as	  we	  have	  
seen,	  	  the	  breadth	  of	  judicial	  enforcement	  is	  critical	  to	  whether	  crowding	  out	  is	  the	  unintended	  
consequence	  of	  formal	  enforcement.	  	  	  	  
	  Our	  analysis	  of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  braiding	  mechanism	  suggests	  that	  the	  parties	  to	  this	  
agreement	  should	  be	  legally	  required	  to	  comply	  with	  their	  initial	  commitments	  to	  pursue	  
promised	  preliminary	  investments	  (typically	  investments	  in	  information)	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  
reveal	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  proposed	  project	  is	  feasible.	  	  But	  formal	  enforcement	  should	  play	  no	  
role	  in	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  project	  should	  go	  forward	  and	  on	  what	  terms.	  	  After	  all,	  
rational	  parties	  will	  pursue	  efficient	  projects	  and	  abandon	  inefficient	  projects.	  	  The	  parties	  already	  
have	  strong	  incentives	  to	  negotiate	  faithfully	  over	  the	  conditions	  for	  achieving	  success.	  	  Rather,	  
the	  challenge	  is	  to	  discourage	  parties	  from	  defecting	  early	  in	  the	  relationship	  before	  a	  robust	  
pattern	  of	  cooperation	  has	  developed.	  	  The	  threat	  of	  a	  legal	  sanction,	  therefore,	  should	  only	  be	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designed	  to	  give	  the	  parties	  sufficient	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  patterns	  of	  cooperation	  supported	  
by	  switching	  costs.	  	  	  	  	  	  
How	  well	  then	  does	  the	  new	  legal	  framework	  governing	  preliminary	  agreements	  support	  
the	  braiding	  mechanism?	  	  In	  our	  analysis,	  the	  complementary	  braiding	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  
enforcement	  will	  be	  successful	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  following	  condition	  is	  satisfied:	  	  The	  courts	  only	  
deploy	  low-­‐powered	  incentives;	  that	  is,	  courts	  only	  sanction	  cheating	  on	  the	  parties’	  mutual	  
commitment	  to	  iterative	  collaboration	  but	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  regulate	  the	  course	  or	  the	  outcome	  of	  
the	  collaboration.	  	  	  Put	  differently,	  if	  the	  preliminary	  agreement	  is	  breached,	  the	  court	  should	  
require	  a	  party	  to	  repay	  the	  price	  the	  counterparty	  paid	  for	  the	  option—the	  amount	  spent	  on	  the	  
preliminary	  investment.	  	  It	  should	  not	  require	  even	  a	  breaching	  party	  to	  exercise	  the	  option,	  
whether	  by	  completing	  the	  transaction	  or	  by	  imposing	  expectation	  damages.	  	  An	  examination	  of	  
litigated	  preliminary	  agreements	  suggests	  that	  courts	  are	  divided	  in	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  
breadth	  of	  their	  role.37	  	  We	  illustrate	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  in	  two	  manifestations	  of	  the	  preliminary	  
agreement	  issue.	  	  The	  first	  is	  its	  application	  in	  a	  general	  commercial	  setting.	  	  The	  second	  is	  its	  
application	  in	  a	  specialized	  form	  of	  preliminary	  agreement	  –	  a	  letter	  of	  intent	  in	  a	  corporate	  
acquisition.	  
	   1.	  	  The	  Commercial	  Setting	  
Consider	  first	  In	  re	  Matterhorn	  Group,	  Inc.38	  	  	  There,	  Swatch	  wanted	  to	  sell	  more	  watches	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  by	  expanding	  its	  franchise	  operations.	  	  	  Matterhorn	  and	  Swatch	  agreed	  to	  
collaborate	  on	  pursuing	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  relationship:	  the	  parties	  signed	  a	  letter	  of	  
intent	  granting	  Matterhorn	  the	  exclusive	  franchise	  for	  thirty	  possible	  sites.	  	  Under	  the	  agreement,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For an analysis of the litigated cases, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 33, at 691-702. 
 
38 2002 WL 31528396 (Bk. S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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Matterhorn	  undertook	  to	  invest	  in	  finding	  appropriate	  locations	  for	  retailing	  Swatch	  watches	  from	  
among	  the	  list	  of	  possible	  locations.	  	  	  Swatch	  undertook	  to	  process	  diligently	  the	  applications	  for	  
franchises	  at	  potentially	  profitable	  locations	  as	  Matterhorn	  filed	  them,	  and	  then	  to	  seek	  financing	  
and	  approval	  of	  franchises	  at	  chosen	  locations	  from	  its	  parent	  firm.	  	  Thus,	  in	  our	  framework	  the	  
parties	  agreed	  to	  collaborate	  by	  making	  concurrent	  investments	  in	  pursuit	  of	  an	  entrepreneurial	  
innovation:	  	  Swatch	  would	  incur	  opportunity	  costs	  (by	  granting	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  Matterhorn)	  
and	  invest	  the	  human	  capital	  needed	  to	  evaluate	  Matterhorn’s	  applications	  and	  to	  become	  familiar	  
with	  the	  American	  business	  climate;	  Matterhorn	  would	  invest	  the	  search	  and	  information	  costs	  
necessary	  to	  identifying	  profitable	  locations.	  	  The	  project	  contemplated	  an	  iterative	  exchange	  of	  
information	  focused	  on	  finding	  profitable	  retail	  sites	  for	  selling	  Swatch	  watches	  in	  shopping	  malls,	  
but	  precisely	  which	  locations,	  if	  any,	  would	  be	  mutually	  profitable	  could	  not	  be	  determined	  
without	  the	  initial	  investments	  by	  both	  parties.	  	  	  	  	  
	   In	  this	  case,	  the	  parties	  had	  no	  prior	  history,	  they	  did	  not	  share	  membership	  in	  a	  
homogeneous	  community,	  and	  they	  could	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  discipline	  of	  repeated	  exchange	  to	  
constrain	  opportunism.	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  informal	  sanctions	  were	  weak	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  
relationship	  and	  the	  parties	  were	  each	  at	  risk	  of	  exploitation.	  	  And,	  indeed,	  Swatch	  engaged	  in	  just	  
the	  strategic	  behavior	  that	  our	  framework	  predicts:	  it	  delayed	  processing	  several	  applications	  and	  
failed	  to	  secure	  the	  necessary	  approvals.39	  	  The	  court	  found	  Swatch	  to	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  The	  court	  held:	  
	   The	  rejection	  of	  the	  Vail	  application	  violated	  the	  Letter	  of	  Intent.	  The	  Letter	  of	  Intent	  granted	  Matterhorn	  the	  
exclusive	  right	  to	  negotiate	  a	  lease	  in	  Vail	  despite	  Vail's	  geographical	  distance	  from	  Matterhorn's	  base	  of	  
operation	  in	  the	  Northeast.	  Furthermore,	  it	  required	  Swatch	  to	  review	  the	  Vail	  application	  in	  good	  faith,	  and	  
in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  the	  criteria	  discussed	  above....	  [Swatch]	  unilaterally	  rescinded	  the	  exclusivity	  that	  
the	  Letter	  of	  Intent	  had	  granted,	  and	  Swatch's	  [decision]	  to	  reject	  the	  Vail	  application	  was	  improper.	  In	  
addition,	  Matterhorn	  sent	  the	  Vail	  letter	  of	  intent	  in	  late	  April	  1996.	  ....	  Swatch	  took	  four	  months	  to	  complete	  
its	  processing	  of	  the	  application....	  Accordingly,	  Swatch	  breached	  the	  Letter	  of	  Intent	  by	  rejecting	  the	  Vail	  
application	  for	  improper	  reasons.	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preliminary	  agreement	  to	  bargain	  in	  good	  faith	  and	  awarded	  Matterhorn	  reliance	  damages	  based	  
on	  its	  investment	  expenditures	  in	  investigating	  the	  locations	  in	  question.	  	  Importantly,	  however,	  
the	  court	  denied	  Matterhorn’s	  claim	  for	  expectation	  damages	  based	  on	  lost	  profits,	  holding	  that	  
“there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  it	  would	  have	  opened	  a	  store	  in	  [that	  location].”40	  	  Thus	  the	  court	  
compensated	  Matterhorn	  for	  the	  price	  it	  paid	  for	  the	  option,	  but	  did	  not	  protect	  it	  from	  Swatch’s	  
decision	  not	  to	  exercise	  it.	  
	   The	  result	  in	  Matterhorn	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  narrowly-­‐defined	  duties	  of	  
good	  faith	  will	  complement	  a	  regime	  that	  depends	  primarily	  on	  informal	  enforcement.	  	  A	  properly	  
configured	  braiding	  mechanism,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  that	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	  court	  in	  
Matterhorn,	  likely	  will	  not	  crowd	  out	  the	  informal	  mechanisms	  that	  build	  trust	  but	  rather	  will	  offer	  
a	  low-­‐powered	  complement	  during	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  collaboration,	  thereby	  giving	  reciprocity	  
and	  trust	  the	  opportunity	  to	  evolve.	  	  	  	  	  
2.	  	  Preliminary	  Agreements	  in	  Corporate	  Acquisitions:	  Letters	  of	  Intent	  and	  
the	  Duty	  to	  Negotiate	  in	  Good	  Faith	  	  
	  
	   The	  pattern	  of	  preliminary	  agreements	  that	  contemplate	  concurrent	  preliminary	  
investments	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  corporate	  acquisitions.	  	  	  We	  turn	  now	  to	  several	  
cases	  that	  illustrate	  this	  pattern.	  	  They	  also	  illustrate	  the	  adverse	  consequences	  when	  courts	  fail	  to	  
understand	  the	  interaction	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  enforcement	  
a.	  	  Tan	  v.	  Allwaste,	  Inc.	  
Tan	  v.	  Allwaste,	  Inc.,	  involved	  a	  claim	  by	  shareholders	  of	  Geotrack	  that	  Allwaste	  had	  
breached	  an	  obligation	  to	  negotiate	  in	  good	  faith	  Geotrak’s	  acquisition.	  	  Discussions	  between	  
Allwaste	  and	  Geotrack	  had	  led	  to	  the	  parties	  executing	  a	  letter	  of	  intent	  that	  stated	  Allwaste’s	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  16-­‐17.	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intention	  to	  make	  the	  acquisition	  subject	  to	  satisfactory	  due	  diligence.	  	  The	  letter	  of	  intent	  also	  
stated	  that	  it	  “does	  not	  constitute	  a	  binding	  agreement	  among	  the	  parties”	  and	  further	  stated	  that,	  
according	  to	  the	  court,	  “the	  parties	  do	  not	  have	  a	  deal	  until	  a	  formal	  agreement	  was	  executed.”	  	  	  
However,	  the	  letter	  did	  contain	  some	  binding	  obligations.	  	  It	  bound	  the	  parties	  to	  pursue	  a	  deal	  in	  
good	  faith	  and	  contained	  a	  “no	  shop”	  clause	  by	  which	  Geotrack	  promised	  not	  to	  shop	  Allwaste’s	  
stock	  offer	  to	  other	  potential	  buyers.	  	  During	  the	  due	  diligence	  investigation,	  Allwaste	  discovered	  
Geotrack	  had	  not	  remitted	  payroll	  and	  withholding	  taxes	  to	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Service	  for	  some	  
time.	  	  Allwaste	  withdrew	  from	  further	  negotiations	  and	  was	  unwilling	  to	  buy	  Geotrack	  even	  after	  
it	  offered	  to	  lower	  the	  price.	  	  	  
	   This	  preliminary	  acquisition	  agreement	  can	  be	  fairly	  characterized	  as	  an	  innovative	  effort	  
to	  secure	  the	  synergies	  that	  might	  arise	  from	  combining	  the	  Allwaste	  and	  Geotrack	  businesses,	  
whose	  assessment	  and	  ultimate	  success	  depends	  on	  both	  parties	  making	  preliminary	  investments	  
in	  the	  proposed	  project	  concurrently.	  	  Here	  the	  buyer	  invests	  in	  information	  (due	  diligence)	  to	  
determine	  the	  actual	  condition	  of	  Geotrack’s	  business	  and	  to	  develop	  the	  information	  necessary	  to	  
assess	  the	  potential	  for	  synergy	  and	  the	  difficulty	  in	  actually	  achieving	  it.	  	  In	  turn,	  this	  investment	  
is	  protected	  by	  a	  no-­‐shop	  clause:	  the	  seller	  cannot	  use	  the	  fact	  of	  Allwaste’s	  interest	  to	  induce	  
other	  buyers	  to	  enter	  a	  competing	  bid	  and	  thereby	  devalue	  Allwaste’s	  investment	  in	  information.	  	  
Thus	  Geotrack	  makes	  an	  opportunity	  cost	  investment	  and	  incurs	  the	  potential	  costs	  of	  running	  the	  
business	  without	  change	  and	  subject	  to	  its	  competitors’	  actions	  	  while	  Allwaste	  undertakes	  its	  
investigation.41	  	  Concurrent	  investment	  and	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  together	  will	  show	  whether	  a	  
profitable	  project	  exists,	  at	  which	  time	  the	  parties	  would	  be	  free	  to	  write	  a	  contract	  to	  complete	  
the	  acquisition	  if	  the	  underlying	  innovation	  was	  feasible.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Sellers in these acquisition agreements may also invest in the synergies that result from integration.  See Gilson & 
Schwartz, Understanding MACs, 33 J.L.Econ. & Org. 330 (2005). 
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   In	  this	  case,	  the	  court	  correctly	  held	  that	  the	  letter	  agreement	  was	  a	  preliminary	  agreement	  
obligating	  Allwaste	  to	  negotiate	  further	  in	  good	  faith	  with	  Geotrack:	  in	  our	  terms,	  this	  was	  a	  low-­‐
powered	  formal	  obligation	  that	  supported	  the	  concurrent	  investment	  that	  was	  necessary	  to	  get	  
the	  parties	  to	  the	  point	  where	  they	  could	  assess	  whether	  synergy	  gains	  could	  be	  captured	  and	  
then	  decide	  whether	  to	  complete	  a	  transaction.	  	  However,	  the	  court	  went	  a	  step	  further	  by	  also	  
concluding	  that	  there	  was	  sufficient	  evidence	  for	  a	  reasonable	  jury	  to	  conclude	  that	  although	  the	  
target	  had	  failed	  to	  disclose	  that	  it	  had	  not	  paid	  its	  payroll	  and	  withholding	  taxes	  for	  some	  time,	  
Allwaste	  had	  declined	  to	  go	  forward	  with	  the	  deal	  for	  reasons	  that	  were	  unrelated	  to	  Geotrack’s	  
actions,	  omissions,	  or	  financial	  status.42	  	  On	  this	  basis,	  the	  court	  concluded	  that	  the	  case	  would	  go	  
to	  a	  jury	  to	  determine	  whether	  Allwaste	  had	  breached	  its	  obligation	  to	  negotiate	  in	  good	  faith	  
because	  it	  may	  have	  declined	  to	  go	  forward	  with	  the	  transactions	  for	  reasons	  unrelated	  to	  the	  
target’s	  misbehavior.43	  
Under	  these	  circumstances,	  exposing	  Allwaste	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  jury	  finding	  a	  bad	  faith	  
failure	  to	  negotiate	  transforms	  the	  preliminary	  agreement	  from	  a	  low-­‐powered	  formal	  
enforcement	  tool	  that	  supports	  the	  diligence	  process	  necessary	  to	  assessing	  the	  potential	  for	  
innovation,	  to	  a	  high-­‐powered	  sanction	  that	  exposes	  Allwaste	  to	  large	  damages	  from	  not	  making	  
the	  acquisition.44	  	  There	  was	  no	  allegation	  that	  Allwaste	  had	  not	  made	  its	  preliminary	  investment	  
in	  assessing	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  acquisition;	  it	  had	  paid	  the	  price	  for	  its	  option.	  	  Rather,	  Geotrack	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 In particular, plaintiffs noted the acquisition of Geotrack was to be debt free, so Geotrack's tax liability should not 
have affected Allwaste's analysis of the deal. Plaintiffs also provided evidence that Allwaste simply decided not to 
conduct any more acquisitions. 1997 WL 337207 at 4.  However, Allwaste might well have concluded that a 
counterparty that lied about its liabilities may have been lying about other matters, such as the condition of its assets 
or the non-debt aspects of its financial condition that a debt free acquisition would not protect against. 
43 The court appears to have concluded that if Allwaste declined to go forward with the acquisition because it 
“simply decided not to conduct any more acquisitions”, id. at 4, a jury could conclude that it breached its 
preliminary agreement.  In other words, the court construed the obligation as prohibiting a change in one party’s 
strategy. 
44 The court did not limit potential damages to Geotrack’s reliance costs, thus leaving open the possibility that 
Allwaste could be held to benefit of the bargain damages. 
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alleged	  that	  Allwaste	  had	  merely	  concluded	  that	  the	  acquisition	  was	  no	  longer	  advantageous,	  
which	  the	  court	  concluded	  would	  be	  a	  breach.	  	  	  So	  expansive	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  good	  faith	  
obligation	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  formal	  enforcement	  goes	  much	  further	  than	  the	  low-­‐
powered	  enforcement	  associated	  with	  a	  braiding	  strategy,	  which	  contemplates	  only	  that	  each	  
party	  is	  held	  to	  making	  the	  preliminary	  investments	  necessary	  to	  assess	  the	  acquisition,	  but	  
neither	  is	  obligated	  to	  close	  the	  transaction.	  	  More	  concretely,	  a	  braiding	  strategy	  does	  not	  
envision	  that	  a	  letter	  of	  intent	  shifts	  the	  risk	  of	  changes	  in	  general	  economic	  conditions	  or	  the	  
potential	  buyer’s	  circumstances	  or	  strategy	  to	  the	  buyer.	  	  Such	  an	  expansion	  of	  formal	  
enforcement	  is	  precisely	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  enforcement	  
that	  is	  associated	  with	  crowding	  out	  the	  development	  of	  informal	  patterns	  of	  cooperation	  
necessary	  to	  exploit	  the	  potential	  for	  innovation	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  The	  court	  in	  Tan	  v.	  Allwaste	  
unwisely	  departed	  from	  the	  kind	  of	  low-­‐powered	  enforcement	  necessary	  to	  support	  effective	  
braiding,	  and	  thereby	  restricted	  the	  range	  of	  contractual	  techniques	  available	  to	  parties	  seeking	  to	  
innovate.	  
b.	  VS	  &	  A	  Communications	  and	  Venture	  Associates	  
The	  potentially-­‐dysfunctional	  reasoning	  and	  result	  in	  Tan	  v.	  Allwaste	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  
example	  of	  a	  single	  judge	  getting	  it	  wrong.	  	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  theoretically	  sound	  principle	  to	  guide	  
judicial	  enforcement	  of	  a	  letter	  of	  intent	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  comparing	  the	  efforts	  of	  two	  distinguished	  
jurists	  confronting	  this	  problem—then-­‐Delaware	  Chancellor	  William	  T.	  Allen,	  and	  then-­‐Chief	  
Judge	  Richard	  Posner	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Seventh	  Circuit.	  	  Both	  reach	  the	  
right	  result	  in	  the	  end,	  but	  Chancellor	  Allen	  inflicted	  on	  the	  defendant	  a	  costly	  trial	  that	  he	  later	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acknowledged	  was	  unnecessary,45	  and	  Judge	  Posner,	  albeit	  in	  dicta,	  held	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  
the	  damages	  for	  breach	  of	  an	  obligation	  to	  negotiate	  in	  good	  faith	  contained	  in	  a	  letter	  of	  intent	  
might	  extend	  to	  expectation	  damages.46	  
	   In	  VS	  &	  A	  Communications,	  Chancellor	  Allen	  considered	  the	  claim	  that	  an	  obligation	  to	  
negotiate	  in	  good	  faith,	  contained	  in	  a	  letter	  of	  intent	  concerning	  an	  acquisition,	  in	  effect	  required	  
the	  seller	  to	  close	  the	  transaction	  on	  terms	  that	  the	  buyer	  alleges	  the	  seller	  could	  not	  in	  good	  faith	  
have	  rejected.47	  	  While	  the	  facts	  that	  give	  the	  buyer’s	  position	  at	  least	  surface	  plausibility	  are	  
complicated,	  Chancellor	  Allen’s	  framing	  of	  the	  issue	  is	  not:	  
In	  my	  opinion	  [the	  letter	  of	  intent]	  does	  create	  an	  implied	  obligation	  to	  keep	  the	  
Stations	  off	  the	  market	  and	  not	  to	  offer	  to	  sell	  or	  negotiate	  with	  others	  concerning	  
the	  sale.	  	  In	  addition,	  [the	  buyer]	  was	  obligated	  to	  continue	  to	  assist	  the	  negotiation	  
process	  in	  specific	  ways:	  to	  afford	  information,	  for	  example.	  	  These	  obligations	  are	  
real	  and	  they	  would	  have	  value	  to	  one	  negotiating	  to	  buy	  the	  Stations.	  	  But	  the	  
obligation	  …	  does	  not	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  constitute	  a	  concession	  from	  the	  seller	  of	  its	  
right	  as	  a	  property	  owner	  to	  change	  its	  mind	  …	  prior	  to	  the	  time	  it	  agrees	  to	  bind	  
itself	  legally	  to	  a	  sale.	  .	  .	  .	  	  
	  
Markets	  change.	  	  Negotiating	  a	  complex	  transaction	  is	  always	  subject	  to	  the	  risk	  that	  
a	  material	  change	  in	  a	  relevant	  market	  will	  suddenly	  make	  a	  proposed	  deal	  
uneconomic	  from	  one	  side	  of	  the	  transaction	  or	  the	  other.	  	  That	  risk	  inevitably	  exists	  
until	  a	  party	  is	  legally	  bound.48	  
	  
Thus	  Chancellor	  Allen	  reaches	  a	  conclusion	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  low-­‐powered	  formal	  
enforcement	  of	  a	  braiding	  strategy	  and	  the	  avoidance	  of	  a	  crowding	  out.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  Chancellor	  Allen	  was	  writing	  a	  post-­‐trial	  opinion.	  	  As	  he	  said,	  “It	  may	  be	  that,	  
taking	  the	  view	  of	  this	  case	  that	  I	  now	  do,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  permissible	  to	  grant	  summary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 VS & A Communications Partners, L.P. v. Palmer Broadcasting Limited Partnership, 1992 WL 339377 (Del.Ch. 
1992). 
46 Venture Associates Corporation v. Zenith Data Systems Corporation, 96 F. 3rd 275 (7th Cir. 1996). 
47 The case is unusual in that typically it is the buyer who elects not to go forward. 
 
48 1992 W.L. 339377 at 8. 
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judgment	  of	  dismissal	  to	  defendants.	  	  That	  course	  would	  have	  saved	  the	  substantial	  effort	  and	  
expense	  entailed	  in	  the	  trial	  that	  has	  now	  been	  completed.”49	  
The	  risk	  of	  trial,	  especially	  trial	  to	  a	  jury	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  bench	  trial	  found	  in	  the	  
Delaware	  Chancery	  Court,	  becomes	  especially	  significant	  if	  the	  potential	  damage	  remedy	  extends	  
not	  just	  to	  reliance	  damages	  (the	  amount	  of	  one	  party’s	  preliminary	  investment),	  but	  also	  to	  
benefit	  of	  the	  bargain	  damages	  (the	  profits	  the	  party	  would	  have	  earned	  had	  the	  acquisition	  
actually	  been	  completed).	  	  And	  here	  is	  where	  Judge	  Posner’s	  opinion	  in	  Venture	  Associates	  
Corporation50	  becomes	  relevant.	  	  	  
Judge	  Posner	  correctly	  concludes,	  as	  did	  Chancellor	  Allen,	  that	  an	  obligation	  to	  negotiate	  in	  
good	  faith	  contained	  in	  a	  letter	  of	  intent	  does	  not	  constrain	  a	  party	  from	  changing	  its	  view	  of	  the	  
desirability	  of	  an	  acquisition	  in	  light	  of	  a	  change	  in	  conditions:	  	  
Since	  [the	  seller]	  had	  not	  agreed	  on	  the	  sale	  price,	  it	  remained	  free	  to	  demand	  a	  
higher	  price	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	  the	  market	  value	  of	  the	  company	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
actual	  sale.	  	  …	  [The	  seller]	  was	  free	  to	  demand	  as	  high	  a	  price	  as	  it	  thought	  the	  
market	  would	  bear,	  provided	  that	  it	  was	  not	  trying	  to	  scuttle	  the	  deal…	  	  If	  the	  
market	  value	  …	  rose…	  	  say	  to	  $25	  million,	  [the	  seller]	  would	  not	  be	  acting	  in	  bad	  
faith	  to	  demand	  that	  amount	  from	  [the	  buyer]	  even	  if	  it	  knew	  that	  [the	  buyer]	  would	  
not	  go	  that	  high.	  	  [The	  seller]	  would	  be	  acting	  in	  bad	  faith	  only	  if	  its	  purpose	  in	  
charging	  more	  than	  {the	  buyer]	  would	  pay	  was	  to	  induce	  [the	  buyer]	  to	  back	  out	  of	  
the	  deal.51	  	  	  
	  
Consistent	  with	  proper	  judicial	  enforcement	  of	  a	  braiding	  strategy,	  a	  party	  is	  not	  committed	  to	  
exercising	  the	  option	  to	  close	  the	  transaction.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Id. at 2. 
50 Venture Associates Corporation v. Zenith Data Systems Corporation, 96 F. 3rd 275 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 
51 96 F. 3rd at 279-80.  Judge Posner does not address the broader point made by Chancellor Allen that the changed 
conditions that have affected the price would allow the seller in good faith simply to decline to complete the 
transaction. 
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However,	  the	  risk	  of	  trial	  becomes	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  crowd	  out	  informal	  contracting,	  even	  
if	  the	  charge	  to	  the	  jury	  is	  correct,	  if	  the	  potential	  damages	  are	  calculated	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  breach	  of	  an	  
obligation	  to	  pursue	  the	  ultimate	  deal.	  	  	  And	  here	  Judge	  Posner	  expresses	  the	  view	  that	  the	  threat	  
is	  real:	  “[d]amages	  for	  breach	  of	  an	  agreement	  to	  negotiate	  may	  be,	  although	  they	  are	  unlikely	  to	  
be,	  the	  same	  as	  the	  damages	  for	  breach	  of	  the	  final	  contract	  that	  the	  parties	  would	  have	  signed	  had	  
it	  not	  been	  for	  the	  defendant’s	  bad	  faith.”52	  	  The	  difficulty	  with	  Judge	  Posner’s	  invitation	  to	  courts	  
to	  award	  expectation	  damages	  is	  that	  it	  blurs	  the	  separation	  between	  the	  formal	  portion	  of	  the	  
braided	  contract	  and	  the	  informal	  portion,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  risk	  of	  crowding	  out.	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The	  conclusion	  in	  Tan	  v.	  Allwaste	  that	  a	  party	  who	  has	  made	  the	  contemplated	  preliminary	  
investment	  cannot	  simply	  decline	  to	  close	  the	  transaction,	  together	  with	  Chancellor	  Allen’s	  
subjecting	  such	  a	  party	  to	  trial	  and	  Judge	  Posner’s	  holding	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  party	  might	  
be	  subject	  to	  expectation	  damages	  premised	  on	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  final	  contract,	  illustrates	  the	  
importance	  of	  a	  theory	  to	  explain	  the	  underlying	  commercial	  behavior	  and	  prescribe	  the	  
appropriate	  facilitative	  role	  for	  courts.	  	  No	  matter	  how	  sharp	  the	  intuitions	  of	  experienced	  judges,	  
courts	  unguided	  by	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  are	  prone	  to	  err.	  	  Thus	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  court	  failed	  
to	  embrace	  fully	  the	  notion	  that	  an	  enforceable	  preliminary	  agreement	  only	  requires	  a	  party	  to	  
pay	  the	  option	  price	  by	  undertaking	  a	  promised	  investment	  in	  acquiring	  and	  sharing	  information.	  	  
Framing	  the	  obligation	  in	  this	  way	  should	  permit	  a	  party	  to	  properly	  obtain	  a	  summary	  judgment	  
even	  though	  it	  walks	  away	  from	  the	  transaction	  for	  reasons	  wholly	  unrelated	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  
counterparty.	  	  And	  even	  if	  the	  promised	  investment	  is	  not	  made,	  the	  defendant’s	  liability	  is	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properly	  limited	  to	  the	  investment	  cost	  and	  not	  to	  the	  expectancy	  that	  might	  result	  from	  a	  
concluded	  deal.	  
C.	  How	  Courts	  Can	  Know	  Braiding	  When	  They	  See	  It	  	  	  
An	  important	  theme	  emerges	  from	  the	  preceding	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  the	  evolving	  case	  law	  
governing	  braided	  contracts.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  duty	  to	  negotiate	  in	  good	  faith	  in	  preliminary	  
agreements	  and	  letters	  of	  intent	  provides	  a	  useful	  doctrinal	  placeholder	  permitting	  courts	  to	  imply	  
a	  governance	  structure	  to	  support	  agreements	  that	  rely	  principally	  on	  iterative	  investments	  in	  
information.	  	  However,	  the	  new	  obligation	  to	  negotiate	  in	  good	  faith	  is	  unmoored	  because	  the	  
cases	  do	  not	  indicate	  what	  the	  parties	  are	  supposed	  to	  bargain	  over,	  or	  when	  the	  refusal	  to	  agree	  
constitutes	  bad	  faith,	  or	  just	  what	  should	  be	  the	  remedy	  for	  bad	  faith.	  	  Under	  contemporary	  legal	  
doctrine,	  for	  example,	  the	  question	  of	  when	  preliminary	  agreements	  should	  be	  enforced	  requires	  a	  
multi-­‐factor	  analysis	  that	  invokes	  the	  language	  of	  the	  agreement,	  the	  existence	  and	  number	  of	  
open	  terms,	  the	  extent	  of	  any	  reliance	  investments,	  and	  the	  customary	  practice	  regarding	  
formalities.	  	  The	  court,	  in	  addition,	  is	  required	  to	  consider	  the	  context	  of	  the	  negotiations	  resulting	  
in	  the	  preliminary	  agreement.53	  	  Such	  a	  laundry	  list	  of	  relevant	  factors	  leaves	  the	  decision	  process	  
largely	  obscure.	  	  That	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  when,	  as	  is	  typical,	  courts	  fail	  to	  attach	  weights	  to	  the	  
factors	  or	  specify	  the	  relationship	  among	  them.54	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  theory,	  the	  courts	  are	  left	  to	  
interpret	  criteria	  for	  imposing	  liability	  that	  are	  unconnected	  to	  the	  operative	  facts	  that	  might	  
justify	  formal	  enforcement.	  	  	  
Our	  theory	  of	  how	  courts	  can	  best	  support	  the	  braiding	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  contracting	  
provides	  a	  coherent	  way	  to	  think	  about	  the	  domain	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  obligation	  to	  negotiate	  in	  
good	  faith:	  Courts	  best	  respond	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  preliminary	  agreements	  induced	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See TIAA v. Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 500-02. 
54 Schwartz & Scott, supra note33, at 675-6.    
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innovation	  under	  uncertainty	  by	  imposing	  low-­‐powered	  sanctions	  designed	  to	  encourage	  
compliance	  with	  the	  information-­‐exchange	  regime	  while	  avoiding	  high-­‐powered	  sanctions	  that	  
crowd	  out	  informal	  enforcement	  and	  destroys	  the	  braid.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  duty	  to	  negotiate	  in	  good	  
faith	  means	  that	  parties	  should	  be	  held	  to	  their	  commitment	  to	  make	  initial	  investments	  in	  
collaboration	  and	  nothing	  else.	  55	  	  Thereafter,	  each	  party	  faces	  a	  choice	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  proceed	  
to	  a	  fully	  enforceable,	  formal	  obligation.	  	  The	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  nature	  of	  low-­‐powered	  
sanctions,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  recognize	  that	  an	  obligation	  to	  collaborate	  is	  not	  an	  obligation	  to	  
bargain.	  	  Whenever	  a	  court	  holds,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  that	  the	  dissenting	  party	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  
bargain	  in	  good	  faith,	  it	  follows	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  state	  of	  the	  world	  in	  which	  failing	  to	  reach	  
agreement	  is	  a	  breach.	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  that	  trap	  that	  led	  the	  court	  in	  Tan	  v.	  Allwaste	  and	  Judge	  
Posner	  in	  Venture	  Associates	  to	  err.	  	  	  	  
	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Our principal concern has been the question of what it means to formally enforce these preliminary obligations.  But, as 
noted above, the criteria for determining when parties have reached such an agreement are also needlessly vague.  See note -- 
supra.  Since parties are always free to indicate their desire to be completely free from formal enforcement, courts should 
hold all commercial parties to an obligation to invest as promised whenever they agree to invest collaboratively in a letter of 
intent or other similar form of transaction.   
